Abstract The achieved international consensus on the 1.5-2°C target entails that most of current fossil fuel reserves must remain unburned. A major contribution has to come from coal as both the most abundant and the most emission-intensive fuel. Currently, a majority of climate policies aiming at reducing coal consumption are directed towards the demand side. In the absence of a global carbon-pricing regime, these policies are prone to carbon leakage and other adverse effects. Supply-side climate policies present an alternative and increasingly discussed approach to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. In this article, I employ a numerical model of the international steam coal market to examine two supply-side policies that are currently discussed in academic literature and by policy-makers, alike: (1) a production subsidy reform introduced in major coal-producing countries and (2) a globally implemented moratorium on new coal mines. The model simulates global patterns of coal supply, demand, and international trade, with endogenous investment in coal production and transportation capacities. I find that mere production subsidy removal, while associated with a small positive total welfare effect, leads to a minor reduction of global emissions. By contrast, a mine moratorium induces a much more pronounced reduction in global coal consumption by effectively limiting coal availability and strongly increasing prices. Depending on the specification of reserves, the moratorium can induce a coal consumption path consistent with the 1.5-2°C target.
Introduction
The 2015 Paris Agreement has brought about a clear commitment to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to a level that is supposed to keep the increase of global mean temperature below 2°C and striving for 1.5°C.
1 McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimate that achieving the 2°C goal requires leaving a large share of current fossil fuel reserves in the ground. Given its limited use for activities other than heat generation and resulting low economic value (Collier and Venables 2014) , on the one hand, and its abundance on the other hand, 82-88% of current coal reserves need to be left unburned until 2050 (McGlade and Ekins 2015) . 2 Despite the understanding that reducing carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions and refraining from coal consumption are inseparably linked, there is a lack of global action in this area. Even if most of currently announced climate policies and plans, including most of the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), 3 were to be implemented, the central International Energy Agency (IEA) World Energy Outlook (WEO) scenario (IEA/OECD 2015a, New Policies Scenario (NPS)) still projects a 15% increase of annual global emissions by 2040. Coal production is expected to rise by 18% during the same period. Even though the scenario fails to incorporate some of the major trends with respect to the restructuring of global energy systems, 4 the general conclusion that currently discussed policies will not lead to a deep decarbonization is still valid.
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While most of these policies are directed towards the demand side of fossil fuels, scholars have argued that supply-side policies hold promise as complementary tools to achieve the desired emission reductions (see, e.g., Lazarus et al. (2015) ). 6 The contribution of this article is to quantify the effects of two supply-side policies that are currently discussed in the academic literature and by policy-makers, alike, to complement the wide range of demand-side policies in further reducing fossil fuel consumption.
The first policy is a removal of coal production subsidies. This policy measure can be seen as part of the international ambition to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, as agreed on, for example, by the G20 (2009). It comes with a double dividend of removing heavy burdens from public budgets and reducing GHG emissions. Additionally, it can prevent carbon lock-in by reducing capital-intensive investments from state-owned and international investors (Bast et al. 2015) . Starting from a discussion of different methodologies for identifying subsidy levels, the article at hand contributes to the literature by summarizing available information on coal 1 From here on referred to as 2°C (goal). 2 The difference in the two numbers accounts for possible future use of Carbon Capture, Transport and Storage (CCS), a technology which has thus far not lived up to high hopes (Oei and Mendelevitch 2016) . 3 With one major exception, the INDCs submitted by India are not fully incorporated. The original target for solar PV installed until 2022 is reduced to 40 GW (IEA/OECD 2015a, 498), which increases consumption of fossil fuels to cover increasing energy demand, and thus induced an overestimation of coal demand. 4 Namely, the scenario misses current developments like the peak in coal consumption (NBSC 2015) and a moratorium on new coal power plants and mines in China (see The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2016) and Boren (2016) ), and the banning of coal from the energy mix in a number of European countries like the UK (cf. Rudd 2015) . 5 Though COP23 shows increasing momentum to phase out coal in some economies (cf. global alliance to phase out coal, Powering Past Coal (2017)), concrete policies are needed to bring a global coal phase out about (Piggot et al. 2017) . 6 As argued in Bertram et al. (2015) , a policy mix can inter alia help to increase the feasibility of policy measures, as it serves to cushion distributional effects and limit efficiency losses. production subsidies in the major producing countries. The estimated levels vary significantly between US$0.1/t in Poland and US$3.4/t for coal from the US Powder River Basin. Depending on the producer, this corresponds to less than 1% of production cost for Poland and South Africa, up to 34% for Powder River Basin coal.
The second policy examined in this article is a permanent moratorium on new coal mines, as suggested by the former President of Kiribati Tong (2015), supported by scholars (e.g., Grantham Research Institute 2015) and NGOs (e.g., Denniss 2015) and implemented in a number of countries (e.g., China, see The State Council of the People's Republic of China (2016)). This policy could be implemented in various ways, for instance by stopping the issuance of licenses for new mining projects and by not renewing those of inactive projects. However, a publically available dataset on reserves in existing mining operations is lacking. Therefore, I compiled an own dataset based on individual, publically available information. It shows that about one third of global reserves reported in international surveys (e.g., BGR 2015) are located in currently active mines. This share is largest in South Africa (69%) and smallest in the USA (8%).
To assess the implications of these two policies, I employ a comprehensive model of the world steam coal market COALMOD-World (see Holz et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the model). It assesses effects on global steam coal trade, prices, and CO 2 emissions from coal consumption as well as the distributional implications of different policies. The model has been used in various contexts before: Haftendorn (2012) studies the market structure in the Atlantic steam coal market. Haftendorn et al. (2012) use COALMOD-World to examine interactions between climate policies and the global steam coal market until 2030. Taking a different approach, Richter et al. (2018) explore the rationale for export taxes on coal and implications for climate change mitigation.
For the analysis, I assume that both the subsidy and the moratorium policy are introduced in 2020. The subsidy removal policy leads to a small reduction in steam coal-related CO 2 emissions of, on average, 82 MtCO 2 per year, which still leaves a gap of 4.6 GtCO 2 to be addressed by other measures to achieve emission reductions consistent with 2°C. Nevertheless, the policy generates considerable additional income for emerging countries (China, US$31.5 bn; India, US$8.1 bn; Indonesia, US$7.2 bn) in the period from 2020 to 2050. These funds can be used to finance additional measures to further reduce CO 2 emissions or to increase the feasibility of these policies through investment or redistribution (see, e.g., Jakob et al. (2015) ). Moreover, the policy generates extra revenue for infra-marginal producers that benefit from an average increase of coal prices by about 1% per year from 2020 to 2040, compared to the reference case. By contrast, a global moratorium on new mining projects could be a major contribution to closing the gap towards a coal consumption that is consistent with 2°C. In fact, the low reserve scenario exceeds reductions implied by the WEO 450 ppm scenario. The supply path in this scenario is, however, in line with McGlade and Ekins' (2015) calculations on Bunburnable^coal reserves. These are required to stay in the ground in order to achieve the 2°C goal, without relying on CCS.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 takes a closer look at coal production subsidies by discussing findings from the literature and presenting own calculations on the effects of subsidy removal. Section 3 details coal reserves in operating mines for the largest producers of steam coal and gives a quantitative assessment of effects of a mine moratorium on the international steam coal market based on different specifications. Section 4 discusses results and concludes. (2015), all acknowledge the importance of phasing out both production-and consumptionrelated fossil fuel subsidies. However, the estimates on the total level of these subsidies vary by an order of magnitude due to different subsidy definitions and different geographical coverage. They range from US$160-200 bn annually-estimated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2015b) for the period 2010-2014-to US$4800 bn estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (cf. Coady et al. (2017) ). Bárány and Grigonytė (2015) and Kojima and Koplow (2015) provide a comparison of the different methodologies to assess the magnitude of fossil fuel subsidies. IEA (IEA/OECD 2016) uses the price-gap approach, which compares the end-user price to a reference price comprising free-on-board costs, cost of shipping plus margins, and taxes. The OECD method (OECD 2015b ) is based on the inventory approach, which concentrates on budgetary support and tax expenditures that entail merits for fossil fuel producers or consumers, relative either to other activities or products or in absolute terms. IMF distinguish between pre-and post-tax subsidies. They adopted the price-gap approach in order to estimate pre-tax subsidies (Coady et al. 2017) . Post-tax subsidies compare actual consumer prices with supply cost plus the efficient level of taxation, which includes externalities (e.g., CO 2 , NOx emissions and local air pollution), 7 and a fair consideration of margins. Due to these methodological differences and different geographic coverage of the databases, IMF subsidy estimates are considerably higher than those published by IEA or OECD.
For production and consumption subsidies on coal in OECD countries plus six major economies, OECD (2015b) estimates annual budgetary support and tax expenditure on subsidies to account for around US$12 bn. A study by Ecofys which includes additional subsidy categories found that coal subsidies in the EU-28 accounted for €10 bn in 2012 (Ecofys 2014) . The IMF finds that global coal subsidies amount to US$2530 bn, annually, with the major contribution of US$2506 bn due to global warming and local pollution externalities.
Sparse literature on removal of coal subsidies
While subsidies are commonly applied on both the demand and the supply sides of fossil fuels, their removal may have very different consequences. There is a large strand of literature analyzing the distributional incidence, induced emissions, and other distorting effects of demand-side fossil fuel subsidies both in general equilibrium models (e.g. del Granado et al. 2012; Dartanto 2013; Burniaux and Chateau 2014; Lin and Ouyang 2014; Schwanitz et al. 2014; Durand-Lasserve et al. 2015) and in sectoral and regional assessments (see, e.g., Rioux et al. (2017) , Teng et al. (2017) , and Bhattacharyya and Ganguly (2017) ). Merrill et al. (2015) provide an overview of models examining the effect of fossil fuel subsidy reforms on greenhouse gas emissions.
In this article, I want to concentrate on the implications of removing financial benefits granted to fossil fuel producers and, more specifically, coal producers. While many studies look into the effect of removing subsidies for all fossil fuels (see above), the literature on the effects of removing coal subsidies is particularly sparse. Anderson and McKibbin (2000) use the general equilibrium framework C-Cubed to assess the economic effects of removing production and consumption subsidies on coal. They examine two scenarios: one in which high-income OECD countries remove domestic coal production subsidies and import restrictions and a second where additionally, non-OECD countries remove coal consumer subsidies and export taxes. They find an average decrease of global CO 2 emissions of 5% for the first, and of 8% for the second scenario. However, these results heavily rely on the authors' Bguess-estimate^of the subsidy levels, with subsidy removal increasing production costs by up to 250%. Fulton et al. (2015) utilize a supply-demand partial equilibrium framework to derive aggregate supply and demand functions and assess the effect of adjusting the supply function by removing subsidies for coal in the US Powder River Basin as well as for Australian coal with a time horizon from 2014 to 2035. In a sensitivity analysis, they compute results for different demand elasticities and find that an increase of Powder River Basin supply costs by US$4 leads to an annual emission reduction of 21-55 MtCO 2 . The authors warn that unilateral removal of subsidies is again prone to leakage effects. Gerasimchuk et al. (2017) provide a comprehensive attempt to assess the GHG effect of removing global fossil fuel production subsidies for the period 2017 to 2050. They use a system dynamics model (GSI-IF(p)) incorporating feedback between subsidy removal, reserves, and economic factors like energy demand, fossil fuel production, fossil fuel prices, and emissions. They find that fossil fuel production subsidy removal would lead to emission reduction of on average 1.1 GtCO 2 per year. For coal, they highlight the sensitivity of results to assumption on supply cost curves and suggest a regionally disaggregated approach.
Quantitative assessment: production subsidy removal
I compile a comprehensive dataset of coal production subsidies in the major coal-producing countries (cf. Table 1 ) covering 87% of coal production in 2013 (IEA/OECD 2015b) and compare it to data provided by Gerasimchuk et al. (2017) . Where possible, I draw from Bast et al. (2015) and the underlying dataset and rely on Fulton et al. (2015) and OECD (2015a) for additional or missing information.
8 Quantitative results are obtained by employing the COALMOD-World model introduced in Holz et al. (2016) .
Given the diverse nature of the different subsidies (cf. Table 1) , their removal will also have complex effects, with different producers affected to varying degrees. However, in COALMODWorld, producers are represented by one aggregate supply curve per production region; therefore, there is no straightforward transferability to account for the removal of individual measures. For reasons of simplicity and tractability, I assume that the removal of subsidies has the same effect on each producer in a region by raising its marginal costs by the levelized value of the total subsidy level.
9 This is implemented via an adjustment of the marginal cost intercept according to the collected subsidy estimates reported in Table 1 . 10 In the case of South Africa, transportation costs between producer and exporter are adjusted, respectively.
The net effect of steam coal production subsidy removal on global CO 2 emissions from steam coal is an emission reduction of 82 MtCO 2 /a (total of 2.5 GtCO 2 until 2050). Roughly, the same effect can be observed if Australia introduces a steam coal export tax of US$18/t (see Richter et al. (2018) ) or if the USA unilaterally decides to introduce a moratorium on new coal mines on federal land (see Section 3).
11 The effect can be considered minor, if compared to the required average reduction of 4.7 GtCO 2 /a, to close the gap between the WEO 2015 NPS and the 450 ppm scenario (cf. Fig. 1b) . Table 2 reports results on producer, exporter, and consumer surplus, as well as total discounted level of removed subsidies.
12 For the period 2020-2050, saved subsidies total US$76 bn. While for the reformed countries, producer surplus is reduced to horizon. South African, Russian, and Polish producers overall benefit from the policy as their cost increase is small relative to their competitors from Indonesia, Australia, and the USA. In general, the removal of producer subsidies does not have any disruptive effect on the steam coal market, as a whole. Total saved subsidy volume accounts for 1.5% of total market volume over the model horizon. Net welfare effect is positive and accounts for 0.4% of total market volume over the same period. Rather, the policy has a redistributive effect. Therefore, its political feasibility crucially hinges on the alternative use of the saved subsidy and the relative power of winners and losers.
A moratorium on new coal mines as a supply-side climate policy
The BNo New Coal Mines^campaign urges the leaders of the world to support a moratorium on new coal mines, and the expansion of existing ones (Tong 2015) . It is supported, inter alia, by Nicolas Stern (Grantham Research Institute 2015) and by the Australia Institute (Denniss 2015), but also China has introduced a temporary moratorium on new coal mines (The State Council of the People's Republic of China 2016) while Indonesia has announced to do so (Indonesia Investments 2016; OCI 2016). 13 However, literature that quantifies the effect of a moratorium on new coal mines is very sparse. For the USA, Erickson and Lazarus (2016) examine the effect of phasing out leases for fossil fuel extraction on government-owned land from which 40% of coal production currently originates. For coal, such a policy could lead to emission reductions of 70 MtCO 2 /a, already corrected for a rise of 30 MtCO 2 /a from an increase in gas-fired electricity production. 14 Finighan (2016) examines whether a global moratorium on coal mines would lead to a remaining coal budget that is consistent with the amount calculated as Bburnable^by the energy system model applied in McGlade and Ekins (2015) . Finighan (2016) highlights the lack of information on coal reserves in existing mines. Based on his own estimates, a mine moratorium would achieve a limitation of coal supply to volumes that are in line with the Bcoal budget^of 120 to 180 Gt calculated by McGlade and Ekins (2015) until 2050.
Heede and Oreskes (2016) provide a detailed dataset of potential emissions of CO 2 and methane from proven reserves of the world's largest state-owned and private company producers of oil, natural gas, and coal. They find that these account for 92% of the remaining 2°C carbon budget, with more than 75% of these reserves being under state control, and suggest differentiated policies addressing the specific risks resulting from this ownership. Although this is a comprehensive study for all fossil fuels, for coal, the results rely on a single tCO 2 per t of coal conversion rate, rather than considering individual energy contents.
However, the analysis has a number of drawbacks: (i) it relies on rule-of-thumb estimates of reserves in operating mines rather than on a comprehensive dataset; (ii) it does not allow for a quantification of the effects on market prices, trade patterns, and potential winners and losers 13 Until the recent inauguration of President Trump in 2016, the USA, under the Obama Administration, was also pursuing a clear Climate Action Plan (The White House 2013) and enacted a mine moratorium on federal land (Warrick and Eilperin 2016). However, using executive orders, Trump has repealed most of Obama's climate policies, including the mine moratorium (The White House 2017a). Moreover, he decided to opt-out from the Paris agreement (The White House 2017b) and, against all trends, has committed himself to revitalize the US coal sector. 14 Their scenario assumes that currently issued licenses where production did not start are revoked and no new licenses are issued; moreover, they account for inter-and infra-fuel substitution.
of such a policy; and (iii) and it does not account for the heterogeneity of coal types and embedded specific CO 2 emissions.
Based on a novel dataset on coal reserves in operating mines (see Appendix B), these shortcomings are addressed in the next section, examining two different reserve scenarios implemented in the COALMOD-World model. Table 3 reports estimates on resources, reserves from BGR (2015), and an own compilation of estimates on reserves in operating mines based on various sources. 15 Due to the divergence in the estimates on coal reserves in operating mines, I set up two extreme scenarios: a high reserve (high res) scenario and a low reserve (low res) scenario (assuming the high and low reserves for China and India, respectively; also see Table 3 17 Just like the WEO 450 ppm scenario (IEA/OECD 2015a), it is in line with 2°C, but by contrast, achieves the target without relying on CCS. Figure 1a reports results on total steam coal consumption levels for the two reserve scenarios until 2040 and contrasts these against the three benchmarks. While the high reserve scenario induces a reduction in consumption below the level of the WEO NPS, it is not in line with a consumption path that meets 2°C. By contrast, the low reserve scenario induces a consumption pattern that undercuts the levels of the WEO 450 ppm scenario. Exhibiting similar supply levels as the M&E scenario, it is consistent with reaching 2°C without the use of CCS.
Quantitative assessment: mine moratorium

Mine moratorium: details on the low reserve scenario 18
Assuming an unanticipated reduction of available reserves to the levels reported in Table 3 in 2020, total production reduces until 2050 by 42%. This corresponds to an emission reduction of on average 6.9 GtCO 2 per year for the period 2020-2050 (cf. Fig. 1b) . Annual CO 2 emissions from coal in 2040 are 75% below the level observed in the reference case. The reserve constraint is binding for all steam coal producers, except for Ukraine, Russia, and Australia Queensland producers, who can even expand their export compared to the reference case. This is because these countries have low domestic consumption and have installed production at large deposits or just recently expanded production, as in the case of Australia. Restricted reserves add a scarcity rent of on average US$52.1/t (production weighted) to the 15 A detailed description of methodologies for assessing reserves, data origins, and calculation methods can be found in Appendix B. In contrast to BGR (2015) which reports aggregated reserves from various reserve categories and level of confidence, the dataset compiled in Appendix B focusses on reserves in operating mines, with a high degree of confidence. I solely rely on publically available and verifiable sources, and where available, data is collected on the individual mine level. Unfortunately, some of the major producing countries do not report their coal reserves on the required level of detail (see Appendix B for individual assumptions and data limitations). 16 See Holz et al. (2016) for the implementation of the WEO 450 ppm scenario in COALMOD-World. 17 See Appendix B for more details and background on this scenario. 18 For more details on the results of the individual scenarios, please see Appendix B.
price of coal in each year. The policy leads to an average global price increase of 93% for the period 2020-2050. The global net welfare effect, disregarding any positive effect on climate change mitigation, is a 19% reduction in welfare, where a relative increase in producer surplus by 70% is outnumbered by a reduction in consumer surplus by 53%. The reduction in net welfare amounts to 18.4% of the volume of the steam coal market in the period 2020 to 2050. The highest reduction in consumer surplus can be observed in China, followed by India and the USA. The policy comes with net welfare gains especially for Russia, Australia, and Colombia, who profit from increased prices and reduced supply from competitors, especially from Indonesia. For South Africa, there is a balance between positive price effects for exports and negative effects of a price increase on domestic consumption.
With tight reserve constraints, Chinese coal reserves are used up by 2040, while it increasingly relies on imports. Seaborne trade sees an even stronger concentration on China Source: based on various sources as described for each country in Appendix B a BGR published an updated version of its assessment of BReserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources^report (BGR 2016) , where figures on reserves and resources were updated. Global reserves increased by 1.9% (with a decrease in the USA and Indonesia, and an increase in Australia, China, India, and Poland). A more in-depth, country-by-country analysis is available from the World Energy Council (2013) which reports a similar value of 691 Gt of proved recoverable reserves but differs for individual countries, as noted by Bauer et al. (2016) . The latter compares the two sources and provides additional information on volume and distribution of reserves for major coal-endowed countries b For China, data on reserves in producing mines could not be obtained. Therefore, numbers are calculated based on the ratio of reserves reported by BGR (2015) to reserve in operating mines directly obtained from literature (for USA, Colombia, Poland, South Africa, Indonesia, and Australia). The number in brackets is based on the highest ratio obtained in South Africa (69%), while the standard assumption is the average ratio (33%) c For India, cmpdi (2014) provides estimates of 19,805 Mt of mineable coal in operating mines. This number excludes reserves in captive mining blocks (total is 48,373 Mt). The allocation of all these blocks except for four was found illegal and arbitrary by the Indian supreme court in 2014 (Rajagopal 2014) . The court ruled that the central government has to re-auction these blocks or has to collect adjustment payments instead. I assume that these blocks remain undistributed as an extreme assumption (number in brackets)
and India, 19 while both domestic supply and exports to other countries are reduced by over 90%. US consumption is reduced by on average 50%, with all reserves being used up by 2040. Similarly, South Africa uses up its reserves by 2040, Indonesia by 2035, and Poland by 2025. In total, international trade is reduced by 42% for the period 2020 to 2040.
Discussion and conclusions
Reducing coal consumption is one of the core means to achieve the 1.5-2°C goal. While traditionally targeted on the demand side, supply-side policies represent an alternative approach that can complement demand-side climate change mitigation efforts. In this article, I investigate the effect of two supply-side climate policies on consumption and coal-induced emissions, prices, and patterns of trade on the international steam coal market and domestic coal markets.
The first policy follows the suggestions of the G20 (2009) and other influential groups and examines the effects of removing subsidies on steam coal production. The policy comes with a double dividend by first, removing heavy burdens from public budgets, and second, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In light of the ambiguity in determining subsidy level, I use conservative estimate finding subsidy levels ranging from US$0.1/t in Poland to US$3.4/t for US coal from the Powder River Basin. While I find a positive net welfare effect of removing these subsidies of in total US$18 bn for the period 2020 to 2050, the effect on CO 2 emissions from coal can be considered small for a global policy. The calculated average annual reduction of 82 MtCO 2 /a only makes up for a small fraction of the 4.7 GtCO 2 /a required to be consistent with 2°C.
Still, the removal of production subsidies for fossil fuels can work as an effective supplyside climate policy, where political feasibility could be increased if the additional revenue is recycled progressively (Jakob et al. 2015) . However, such a reform should not be considered as an isolated measure but as part of an integrated climate policy package (Rentschler and Bazilian 2017) . On the contrary, if accompanying policies aimed at internalizing fossil fuel externalities are not implemented across fuels, a pure subsidy reform can even lead to an increase in domestic coal consumption, as is investigated for Indonesia (ADB 2015) .
As the definition of subsidies is non-specific on whether a subsidy is justified or suited to correct for market failure, the figures used in this article also include measures such as compensation payments for mines shut down in the Chinese BCoal Phase-Out Plan^(cf. Appendix A). These payments may be well justified as they reduce output in the long term and provide a transition period to mitigate negative effects on local small-scale firms. Providing an integrated cost-benefit analysis for each of the policy interventions interpreted as subsidies is beyond the scope of this article. The figures presented should rather be interpreted as first attempt to consistently assess the economic and GHG emission effect of removing coal production subsidies on global coal consumption and trade patterns on the global steam coal market.
In general, only a small set of coal subsidies is quantified. In particular, the set of subsidies included in this analysis does not account for externalities caused by the production and consumption of coal. Various studies tried to assess these hidden subsidies (see, e.g., Cardoso (2015), for a mine-level assessment; AbdelGawad et al. 2015, for human rights implications). Generalized estimates of these Bsocial costs of carbon^are difficult to obtain, but are increasingly incorporated into policy and other impact assessment studies (e.g., Coady et al. 2017 ). Including such additional costs would have a significant effect on coal consumption, but also on trade.
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The second policy investigated in this article is a moratorium on new and expansion of existing mines as suggested by the former President of Kiribati Tong (2015), but also by NGOs and scholars. The policy again comes with a double dividend: First, it achieves emission reductions by conserving reserves, and second, it compensates current resource owners through increased scarcity rents and therefore rising market prices (Denniss 2015; Finighan 2016) . Due to a lack of consistent data on reserves in operating mines, I compiled a dataset based on publicly available data. Total reserves in these mines are estimated at 137.3-210 Gt, depending on assumed reserves, especially for India and China.
While the high estimate of remaining reserves fails to achieve a consumption pattern in line with the WEO 450 ppm scenario, the scenario with low estimates exceeds required reductions. The supply path in this scenario is, however, in line with McGlade and Ekins' (2015) calculations on Bunburnable^coal reserves. These are required to stay in the ground in order to achieve the 2°C goal, without relying on CCS. In the low reserve scenario, prices increase by on average 93%, while total production is reduced by 42%. Not taking into account the positive effects of reduced emissions of CO 2 and other local pollutants as well as other local externalities, the positive effect on producers is outnumbered by a decrease in consumer welfare, leading to a net welfare reduction of 19%.
In the long run, a permanent mine moratorium can be a significant contribution to climate change mitigation, but the policy comes with a serious caveat: In the short to medium term, it is particularly beneficial for current incumbents and disadvantages new entrants (Denniss 2015) . Therefore, such a policy should not be introduced in isolation. Otherwise, there is a risk that it will be deemed a temporal industry support policy that protects current incumbents without any long-term effect on reducing CO 2 emissions.
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The results for the two analyzed policies should be understood as a benchmark for the maximum ability of these policies to close the gap between the current consumption path and one that is consistent with 2°C. The partial equilibrium setting of the underlying model does not specify the substitute that is used to compensate reduced steam coal consumption and therefore does not account for potential CO 2 emissions from alternative sources. Also, the model does not take into account welfare effects of recycling funds freed up by the removal of subsidies for coal production.
Even with the coal phase out momentum gained at COP23 (Powering Past Coal 2017) , implementing the examined policies on a global scale will not be feasible in the short term. The incumbency of state actors, regional development, and energy transition pathways needs to be taken into account when designing targeted climate polices. Nevertheless, both examined policies come with side benefits in the form of additional revenue for the government or incumbent producers, which in both cases can be used to increase the political feasibility of the policy.
Further research should be directed towards studying supply-side policies in a broader scope, covering not only coal but eventually all fossil fuels. 22 The effect of the timing of the introduction and a potential expansion of the policies across fossil fuels should be further investigated. It is likely to govern in how far inter-fuel competition can be used to temporally align incentives and create favorable conditions to introduce such policies.
